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Abstract
Background:  The Bayesian approach is now widely recognised as a proper framework for
analysing risk in health care. However, the traditional text-book Bayesian approach is in many cases
difficult to implement, as it is based on abstract concepts and modelling.
Methods: The essential points of the risk analyses conducted according to the predictive Bayesian
approach are identification of observable quantities, prediction and uncertainty assessments of
these quantities, using all the relevant information. The risk analysis summarizes the knowledge and
lack of knowledge concerning critical operations and other activities, and give in this way a basis
for making rational decisions.
Results: It is shown that Bayesian risk analysis can be significantly simplified and made more
accessible compared to the traditional text-book Bayesian approach by focusing on predictions of
observable quantities and performing uncertainty assessments of these quantities using subjective
probabilities.
Conclusion: The predictive Bayesian approach provides a framework for ensuring quality of risk
analysis. The approach acknowledges that risk cannot be adequately described and evaluated simply
by reference to summarising probabilities. Risk is defined by the combination of possible
consequences and associated uncertainties.
Background
To analyse risk in health care, the Bayesian approach is
widely acknowledged as a proper framework, see e.g. [1]
Spiegelhalter et al. (2003) and the references therein.
However, implementing the Bayesian approach in a prac-
tical context is difficult. The standard text-book Bayesian
analysis ([2] Bernardo and Smith 1994, [3] Singpurwalla
2006) introduces fictional parameters that are difficult to
understand and they complicate the analysis. To explain
this in more detail, consider a Probabilistic Risk Analysis
(PRA) for a specific operation at a specific hospital. Let p
be a parameter expressing the probability that the opera-
tion is unsuccessful, i.e. an accidental event occurs. To
determine p we use models such as event trees and fault
trees. Formalising this means that p is computed using a
function f of a set of parameters q, i.e. p = f(q). Here q is a
vector and could include parameters expressing for exam-
ple human error probabilities and probabilities of failures
of safety barriers. The function f is a model, a representa-
tion of the relationship between the "true" parameters p
and q.
Using the formula p = f(q) and expressing uncertainty dis-
tributions of the parameters q, we can establish an uncer-
tainty distribution of p. This is in practice normally carried
out by means of Monte Carlo simulation. If data become
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available, Bayesian updating can be carried out using
Bayes' theorem. In this way the prior distribution of p is
converted to the posterior distribution of p. The approach
is referred as the probability of frequency approach ([4]
Kaplan and Garrick 1981).
The parameters p  and  q  reflect stochastic uncertainties
(aleatory uncertainties). Subjective probabilities are
assigned to reflect epistemic uncertainties; what are the
correct parameter values? When data become available,
the epistemic uncertainties will be reduced ([3] Singpur-
walla 2006).
This approach to risk analysis has in our view three main
weaknesses:
1. Focus is on fictional parameters which are difficult to
understand.
2. The message of the analysis is being disturbed by a dis-
cussion of uncertainties in parameters constructed by the
analysts.
3. The analysis is too complex to be implemented in prac-
tice.
To understand the meaning of the parameters we have to
introduce infinite populations of similar situations. The
parameter p is a mind constructed quantity not existing in
real life, interpreted as the proportion of unsuccessful
operations when considering an infinite number of simi-
lar operations. But what is the meaning of this popula-
tion? What is "similar"? Do we cover operations in other
hospitals, in other countries, and using different proce-
dures? If we are to assess uncertainties of average perform-
ance of quantities of this population, it is essential that we
have clarified its meaning.
Since the parameters are unknown, we have to address
uncertainties. We do this by the standard Bayesian updat-
ing approach as mentioned above, and we are led to the
posterior distributions of the parameters. A full imple-
mentation of this approach in a PRA could typically mean
hundreds of parameter distributions, and the result being
very wide credibility intervals for the output parameters.
What is then the message from the analysis? The uncer-
tainties are so large that we cannot conclude on the risk
level and the effect of risk reducing measures.
In our view the probability of frequency approach creates
uncertainties, not inherent in the system being studied, by
introducing fictional parameters and then become uncer-
tain about their values.
To reduce the uncertainties, it may be tempting to allow
for uncertainty distributions just on some of the input
parameters, and reflect some but not all factors causing
uncertainties. We often see such a reduced analysis in
practice. But what is then the meaning of the output prob-
ability distributions? The analysis is in fact incomplete.
Such a simplified uncertainty analysis could also be moti-
vated by the fact that a full uncertainty analysis along
these lines is extremely resource demanding and time-
consuming. It is certainly relevant to question the cost-
effectiveness of performing such analyses. The analyses
produce a vast number of figures and distributions, but
what do they add to the decision-making process? We
refer to discussions in [5] Aven (2003) and [6] Aven and
Kvaløy (2002).
In our view the probability of frequency approach cannot
be justified, in general and for health care applications in
particular. To cite [7] Marx and Slonim (2003),
"Healthcare is in many ways different from other
industries. It depends upon human interaction
between patient and a practitioner during illness and
recovery. This interaction is emotional, significant,
and some would argue, essential for recovery. How-
ever, it is "humanness" in health care that is also
responsible for some of the safety problems. Practi-
tioners are not computers and have a limited ability to
process multiple pieces of often-contradictory infor-
mation. Practitioners need to eat, drink, sleep and
have bathroom breaks. They also have personal lives
and stresses that may alter their focus or influence
their attentions while they are caring for patients.
These "human factors" are important considerations
when mapping patient safety problems. The ability to
include these "sociotechnical" effects into the PRA
model improves its use as a tool to facilitate patient
safety interventions".
For such a setting, is it meaningful to search for the correct
risk numbers? Certainly not. Hard data showing the truth
about risk will not be available. Instead we should con-
sider risk analysis as a tool for systematising the available
knowledge and uncertainties. Such information will be
useful for supporting decisions, as it is based on the best
available knowledge.
This leads us to the predictive Bayesian approach, focus-
ing on predictions and uncertainty assessments of observ-
able quantities ([8] Barlow 1998, [5] Aven 2003). We
believe that such a predictive approach is more appropri-
ate for analysing risk, in general and for the health care
area in particular, as there is only one level of uncertainty,
stemming from lack of knowledge. The purpose of the
present paper is to present and discuss concepts and prin-BMC Medical Research Methodology 2007, 7:38 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2288/7/38
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ciples for analysing risk using such an approach in the
health care area. Our main focus is probabilistic risk anal-
ysis (PRA).
PRAs are used to analyse complex systems where there is
a lack of data to accurately predict the future performance
of the system. Insights are obtained by decomposing the
system into subsystems/components for which more
information is available. Overall failure probability and
risk is a function of the system's architecture, and of the
probabilities of failure of the different subsystems/com-
ponents ([9] Paté-Cornell and Dillon 2001).
PRAs are used in many industries to support decision-
making in complex situations involving high risks, see e.g.
[10] Bedford and Cooke (2001). Such analyses are also
seen in health care and patient safety ([7] Marx and Slo-
nim 2003, [11] Battles and Kanki 2004), and in the paper
we specifically address their use in this area.
[7] Marx and Slonim (2003) and [11] Battles and Kanki
(2004) study an application of PRA, the ST-PRA (socio-
technical probabilistic risk assessment). The ST-PRA spe-
cifically addresses human error and behavioural
dimensions. Note that the standard PRA is not restricted
to technical issues. Although the traditional emphasis in
PRAs has been technical issues, human factors have been
incorporated in PRAs for many years. A component in the
system may be a human error. Recently we have also seen
incorporation of organisational issues in PRAs, cf. the I-
Risk ([12] Papazoglou et al. 2003), ARAMIS ([13] Duijm
et al. 2004; [14] Dujim and Goossens, 2006), the BORA
projects ([15] Aven et al. 2006) and the SAM approach
([16] Paté-Cornell & Murphy 1996).
Such analyses must in our view be based on the use of
subjective probabilities. It is considered meaningless to
search for accurate estimates of some "true" risk as in the
probability of frequency approach, reflecting the average
state of a number of human and organisational factors.
The terminology used in this paper related to risk analyses
is in line with the ISO standard on risk management ter-
minology, [17] ISO (2002). A risk analysis includes iden-
tification of hazards and threats, cause analyses,
consequence analyses and risk description. The results of
the analyses are then evaluated. The totality of the analy-
ses and the evaluations are referred to as risk assessments.
The paper is organised as follows. First we present and dis-
cuss a simple example to illustrate some of the basic fea-
tures of the predictive Bayesian approach. Then we
address another example where we show the difference
between the predictive Bayesian approach and the more
traditional text-book Bayesian analysis. Based on these
examples we summarise our main points and conclude.
Methods
The predictive Bayesian approach. A simple PRA health 
care application
In the predictive Bayesian approach there are no fictional
parameters introduced, and no reference to true probabil-
ities. The focus is on the observable quantities, and the
actual population. The observable quantities are quanti-
ties that express states of the "world"; quantities that are
unknown at the time of the analysis but will, if the system/
activity actually is implemented, take some value in the
future and possibly become known.
Applying the predictive approach, we may for example
focus on the number of accidental events X in some spec-
ified operations. We introduce no fictional parameters. By
modelling (for example using event trees and fault trees)
we establish a link g between X and observables on a more
detailed system level, denoted Z = (Z1, Z2, ..., Zm). Here Zi
could be the number of hazardous situations of a certain
type occurring during some operations or an indicator
function which equals 1 if a specific safety barrier fails and
0 otherwise. To illustrate, consider the simple event tree
model in Figure 1. In this model Z1 equals the number of
hazardous situations occurring, Z2 is equal to 1 if the first
safety barrier fails and 0 otherwise, and Z3 is equal to 1 if
the second safety barrier fails and 0 otherwise. The model
g is defined by
An event tree example Figure 1
An event tree example.
Z1
Z2=1
Z3=1
Z2=0
Z3=0BMC Medical Research Methodology 2007, 7:38 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2288/7/38
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X = g(Z) = Z1·Z2·Z3
as X is given by the number of hazardous situations where
both safety barriers fail.
Note that in practice we seldom express the g function
explicitly as in this example. The function is implicitly
given by the system representation, for example the event
tree, the fault tree or the influence diagram ([5] Aven
2003, [8] Barlow 1998).
The quantities X and Z are unknown and in the analysis
we predict these quantities and express associated uncer-
tainties. First we assess the uncertainties of Z. This is used
by assigning subjective probabilities according to the
Bayesian paradigm, and through g we establish a proba-
bility distribution of X. This probability distribution P(X ≤
x) is conditional on the assessor's background informa-
tion K, and we write P(X ≤ x | K). The model g is a part of
this background information. Consequently there is no
meaning in speaking about model uncertainty. Of course,
we may address the accuracy of the model, but that is
another issue. Poor accuracy of the model does not pro-
duce uncertainties in the assigned probability of X, as the
probability is conditional on the use of this model. This is
in contrast to the probability of frequency approach
where model uncertainty exists and should be addressed.
Returning to the event tree example, we establish a predic-
tion of X by the following reasoning: General statistical
data show that the hazardous situation of this type typical
occurs 20 times, and hence we obtain the prediction Z1*
= 20 of Z1. To assess the first safety barrier performance,
consider 10 hazardous situations. Say that the assessor
predict 1 failure. Then this gives aprobability P(Z2 = 1) =
0.1. Now given that the hazardous situation occurs and
the first safety barrier fails, how reliable is the second
safety barrier? Say that we assign a probability of 0.4 in
this case. That means that we predict 4 failures out of 10
cases. Or we could simply say that 0.4 reflects the asses-
sor's uncertainty. The reference is a certain standard such
as drawing a ball from an urn. If we assign a probability of
0.4 for an event A, we compare our uncertainty of A to
occur with drawing a red ball from an urn having 10 balls
where 4 are red.
Hence P(Z2 = 1 | Z1 = 1) = 0.4, and using the model g, we
obtain the prediction X* = Z1*·Z2*·Z3* = 20·0.1·0.4 =
0.8.
We predict 1 accidental event for these operations. Next
we need to address the associated uncertainties. One way
of doing this is to specify a 90% prediction interval for Z1.
If the interval is [10, 100], the assessor is 90% certain that
the number of hazardous situations Z1 will be in this
interval, given the background information of the analy-
sis. The interval is determined based on the available
information, that is, relevant data and expert judgments.
From this analysis we obtain a 90% prediction interval for
X equal to [0, 4], using the same probabilities for the bar-
rier safety failures as above.
More generally we may express a probability distribution
for Z1, and from this we obtain a distribution for X. From
a practical point of view the distribution of Z1 could be
based on intervals for the number of hazardous situations
and accidental events, such as [0, 5], [6, 10], [11, 15], [16,
20], etc. and associated probability assignments for each
of these intervals.
There is no need for introducing a Bayesian updating pro-
cedure for a case like this. All relevant information is
incorporated into the probability assignments for the
quantities Zi and X – no updating is required. For a com-
ment on this, see the discussion and conclusion section.
A parametric probability distribution could also be used
to express the analysts' uncertainties, for Z1 and X. How-
ever, care has to be shown when it comes to the choice of
distribution class and the interpretation of the distribu-
tion and its parameters. In our case, one may feel that a
natural distribution choice for the number of hazardous
situations Z1 is to use the Poisson distribution, with a
specified parameter value. But this distribution has a
rather small variance (equal to its mean) and it may there-
fore not be appropriate for describing the analysts' uncer-
tainty. Instead a gamma-Poisson distribution (negative
binomial distribution) ([8] Barlow 1998) could be used
as this distribution has a larger variance. Note that there is
no correct distribution. The distribution chosen is a sub-
jective assignment describing the analysts' uncertainties.
Nonetheless, we should always question if the assign-
ments are reasonable given the background information.
If there are large uncertainties about the number of haz-
ardous situations, it will be hard to justify the use of the
Poisson distribution. If the background information is
strong, the Poisson distribution may be more adequate
([5] Aven 2003, p. 81).
In practice many events studied in PRA are rare, and the
associated prediction would be no occurrences. The
uncertainties would then simply be expressed through the
probability for the event to occur.
In this framework there is only one type of uncertainties
stemming from lack of information (epistemic uncertain-
ties). This idea is sometimes questioned. It is felt that
some probabilities are easy to assign and feel sure about,
others are vague and it is doubtful that the single number,BMC Medical Research Methodology 2007, 7:38 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2288/7/38
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say 0.1 in the above analysis, means anything. Should not
the vagueness be specified?
To respond on this, let us remember that a probability
P(A) is in fact a short version of a conditional probability
of  A  given the background information K, i.e. P(A) =
P(A|K). This means that even if we assign the same prob-
ability for two probabilities, they may be considered dif-
ferent as the background information is different. In some
cases we may know much about the process and phenom-
ena leading to the event A, and in some cases very little,
but still we assign a probability of say 0.50 in both cases.
However, by considering several similar events of the type
A, as in our event tree example, i.e. we change the per-
formance measure, the difference in the background
information will often be revealed. An illustrating exam-
ple of this is given by [18] Lindley (1985), p. 112. Thus
care has to be shown when defining the performance
measures, and when evaluating probabilities in a deci-
sion-making context. We always need to address the back-
ground information, as it provides a basis for the
evaluation.
A probability is in our context a subjective measure of
uncertainty. However, subjective probabilities are often
defined using utilities ([3] Singpurwalla 2006). This is in
our view unfortunate, as a probability should not be
linked to our attitude to winning or loosing money, but to
uncertainty.
Results
Comparison of the predictive Bayesian approach and the 
traditional text-book Bayesian approach
Consider a patient (L) suffering from a specific disease
and faced with the following treatment options:
Treatment A. This is a traditional treatment with a moder-
ate high success rate, and the complications are rather few.
The treatment is however not able to give the patient full
recovery.
Treatment B: This is an alternative new treatment, with the
potential of giving the patient full recovery. The experi-
ences with this treatment is not strong, but the perform-
ance records from the hospital H offering this treatment
are promising.
The patient L is subject to a choice between these two
treatments. Choosing what risks to take is not a medical
decision ([19] Schneider 2006). As a basis for the patient's
decision, a risk picture is presented. In the following we
will present this picture using a traditional text-book
Bayesian approach and the predictive Bayesian approach.
Traditional text-book Bayesian analysis
Let p1 denote the probability that treatment A results in
success for an arbitrary patient. Similar we define p2 for
treatment B. We interpret these probabilities as success
rates in an infinite population of patients, undergoing the
same treatment. These probabilities (parameters) are
unknown and prior distributions are established describ-
ing the assessor's uncertainties before observations. When
data become available, these distributions are updated by
the standard Bayes updating procedure to give the poste-
rior distributions for the parameters. Probability models
are introduced to carry out this updating procedure. Best
estimates of the probabilities are provided, using the
mean of the posterior distributions. Similar analyses are
performed for the complication rates.
These posterior distributions are presented to the patient,
and constitute the patient's basis for making his/her
choice.
Predictive Bayesian approach
In this case, the patient asks for the following informa-
tion:
• The historical statistical data, i.e. success rates for various
defined populations.
• Risk analysis performed by experts, providing predic-
tions and assessing uncertainties related to the following
quantities:
o Proportion of successful treatments for patients at the
hospital H
o Successful treatment of patient L.
The risk analyses are carried out according to the approach
outlined in the previous section. Expert judgments are
included, to incorporate all relevant information about
the treatments as well as the patient. The reported results
are summarised below:
Consider 100 patients at the hospital H, and let D be the
proportion of successful treatments.
Treatment A: Predicts D equal to 90,
90% prediction interval for D: [85, 95]
P(successful treatment for patient L) = 0.90
Treatment B: Predicts D equal to 95,
90% prediction interval for D: [70, 99]BMC Medical Research Methodology 2007, 7:38 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2288/7/38
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P(successful treatment for patient L) = 0.97
General risk influencing factors, i.e. factors that can influ-
ence the risk and hence the outcome:
• Hospital H infrastructure for performing the treatments
• Physician's competence level
• General health condition and medical history of the
patient
A discussion of these factors and possible others that
could cause unsuccessful results is carried out.
The above risk picture provides the basis for the patient's
decision. Using the new treatment the expressed risk is
lower, when we look at the probability of successful treat-
ment. This new treatment also has the potential of giving
the patient full recovery. However, the experience basis for
this treatment is also lower. This creates some uncertainty,
which has to be balanced against the lower computed risk
numbers.
Discussion and conclusion
The main features of the traditional text-book Bayesian
approach and the predictive Bayesian approach is summa-
rised in Table 1, using the dimensions theoretical perspec-
tive and application oriented perspective:
The differences are demonstrated by the above example.
For this example, we consider the predictive approach to
produce the most informative risk picture, as it is the
patient perspective that is of concern. Data showing the
historical average performance of the treatments obvi-
ously are interesting for the patient, but the assessment
including the specific knowledge about the hospital H
and him/her as a patient, is likely to be given most weight.
It may be responded that it is also possible to produce pre-
dictive distributions in the traditional text-book Bayesian
approach by taking the expectations of the pis. Yes, that is
true. However, such a distribution includes the assessor's
uncertainties of the pis. Why should we incorporate this
uncertainty when our ambition is to assess uncertainties
about successful treatment of patient L. We have to be
careful in defining what are relevant populations. If we
shift to the hospital or national level, would we conclude
in the same way? Yes, the key quantity of interest is:
D: the proportion of successful treatments among those to
be carried out the coming years
and not an underlying theoretical probability p expressing
that treatment A results in success for an arbitrary patient.
By introducing such a probability, we introduce a limiting
quantity, a fictional element, which leads to the wrong
focus, accurate estimation of p instead of D.
According to the Bayesian perspective, probability is a
subjective measure of uncertainty ([20] Lindley 2000).
Probabilities are used to express uncertainties about
unknown quantities. However, we have to acknowledge
that uncertainties about observables cannot be adequately
described and evaluated simply by reference to summaris-
ing probabilities. There is a need for seeing beyond these
values. Computed probabilities are subjective assign-
ments conditioned on the background information
(including assumptions and suppositions). The probabil-
ities are not objective values. The analysis could produce
poor predictions. The risk picture has to include aspects
related to uncertainties in phenomena and processes. Sur-
prises may occur and by just addressing probabilities such
surprises may be overlooked.
We are of course not able to predict all surprises – if that
had been the case, they would not have been surprises.
The risk perspective should be broad enough to allow the
Table 1: Summary of main features of the traditional text-book Bayesian approach and the predictive Bayesian approach
Traditional text-book Bayesian approach Predictive Bayesian approach
Theoretical perspective Application oriented perspective Theoretical perspective Application oriented perspective
Focus on fictional parameters Average patient performance Focus on observable quantities Performance of the individual or 
group considered
Prior and posterior distributions The experts' uncertainties about 
the unknown parameters
Prior and posterior distributions The experts' uncertainties about 
the observable quantities
There exists underlying true 
probabilities
Probabilities and risks are 
unknown and need to be 
estimated
Probability is a subjective measure 
of uncertainty, conditional on the 
assessor's background information
Probability is assigned by the 
assessor
Model uncertainty exists Model uncertainty needs to be 
covered by the analysis
Model uncertainty does not exist. The accuracy of the models needs 
to be addressedBMC Medical Research Methodology 2007, 7:38 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2288/7/38
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uncertainties and possible surprises to be an important
part of the overall risk picture.
A search procedure needs to be established to identify the
uncertainty factors. Such a procedure can be based on an
initial analysis addressing historical records and expert
judgments. The risk influencing factors mentioned above
also indicate areas that may be of concern. Such could be
reflected in the background information of the assigned
probabilities, or calculation procedures could be devel-
oped which more explicitly take them into account, see
e.g. [15] Aven et al. (2006). Furthermore, the assumptions
and suppositions of the probability assignments provide
an additional checklist. We would also like to draw atten-
tion to the list of special consequence features presented
by [21] Renn and Klinke (2002) (see also [22] Kristensen
et.al. 2006). Examples of such features are:
a) Delay effects – which describe the time of latency
between an initial event and the actual damage.
b) Reversibility – which describe the possibility to restore
the situation to the state before damage occurred.
This feature classification system can be used as a checklist
for ensuring the right focus of the analysis, i.e. that we
address the appropriate consequences attributes. But it
can also be used as a checklist for identifying relevant
uncertainty factors. For example, the feature "delay
effects" could lead to a focus on activities or mechanisms
that could initiate deteriorating processes causing future
surprises.
Addressing the uncertainties also mean to consider the
manageability; i.e. to what extent is it possible to control
and reduce the uncertainties, and obtain desirable out-
comes? Some risks are more manageable than others,
meaning that the potential for reducing the risk is larger
for some risks compared to others. By proper uncertainty
management, we seek to obtain desirable consequences.
Expressing risk, also means to perform sensitivity analy-
ses. The purpose of these analyses is to show how sensitive
the output risk indices are with respect to changes in basic
input quantities, for example assumptions and supposi-
tions.
Risk is described by addressing such issues along with the
probabilities. It gives in our view a sound basis for risk
analysis in general and for the health care in particular.
Such a broad perspective on risk is in line with the follow-
ing definition of risk:
Risk related to an activity is defined by the combina-
tion of the possible consequences of the activity and
associated uncertainties ([23] Aven and Kristensen
2005). Subjective probabilities are used to assess the
uncertainties.
Risk analyses are tools providing insights about risks. But
they are just tools – they have limitations. Their results are
conditioned on a number of assumptions and supposi-
tions. The analyses are not expressing objective results. We
should not put more emphasis on the predictions and
assessments of the analyses than what can be justified by
the methods being used. Nonetheless, risk analyses could
be useful as a decision supporting tool in situations with
large uncertainties. They summarize the knowledge and
lack of knowledge concerning critical operations and
other activities, and give in this way a basis for making
rational decisions.
To ensure high quality risk analyses we believe that the
following points, among others, should be highlighted
([24] Aven 2004)
- The analysis team has a thorough understanding of the
system performance and the decision-making process and
context.
- Models used are sufficient accurate representations of the
world, their goodness in describing the world have been
evaluated.
- All observable quantities of the analysis are precisely
defined.
- The meanings of risk and uncertainty are fully under-
stood and consistently treated.
- The background information for the analyses is docu-
mented.
Adopting the predictive Bayesian approach is no guaran-
tee for meeting all these requirements. However, it pro-
vides a framework for ensuring quality of the analyses
along these lines. Risk analyses of health operations, such
as PRAs, must in our view be based on the use of subjec-
tive probabilities. The probabilistic analyses need to be
based on modelling and use of expert judgments, and the
probabilities should express uncertainties in events and
other real quantities, given the available information.
The essential points of the analyses are identification of
observable quantities, prediction and uncertainty assess-
ments of these quantities, using all the relevant informa-
tion. Bayesian updating procedures are of less importance,
as seen from the examples above. The Bayesian updating
procedure may be used for incorporating new informa-
tion, but its applicability is in many cases rather limited.BMC Medical Research Methodology 2007, 7:38 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2288/7/38
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In practice we will often not perform a formal Bayesian
updating to incorporate new observations – rethinking of
the whole information basis and approach to modelling
is required when we conduct the analysis at a particular
point in time.
Of course, there are situations where such procedures pro-
vide a useful basis of the analysis. As an example, consider
an operation where we are concerned about a quantity U
expressing the health condition of the patient. The quan-
tity U is unknown and continuous measurements V1, V2,
..., provide information about U. Then starting from a
prior distribution of U, we establish a posterior distribu-
tion of U using the measurements V1, V2, .... We then need
a distribution of V given U, reflecting the accuracy of the
measurements. Such a procedure is consistent with the
predictive Bayesian approach as all quantities introduced
are observables.
For a successful implementation of risk analysis in health
care, we need an assignment process which is simple, that
works in practice for the number of probabilities and
probability distributions to be determined. We should not
introduce distribution classes with unknown parameters
when not required. Furthermore, meaningful interpreta-
tions must be given to the distributions classes and the
parameters whenever they are used. There is no point in
speaking about uncertainty of parameters unless they are
observables, i.e. not fictional.
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